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OnJuly 1,1997, many Canadianswill celebrate 130 years ofnationhood. Other Canadians won't.
This anniversary is an important one. It
comes at a time when divisions in the Ca-
nadian polity and society are acute and
threaten the very existence of a united
country. In recentyears, nationalists and
doomsday prophets alike - academics,
journalists, broadcasters, and others -
have reached diametrically opposed fore-
casts for the country's future. Will
Canada survive? Yes. But not because it
is inevitable, preordained, or fated. Not
even because it should survive. Canada
will survive because unity offers the best
of all available options for the majon"ty
ofthe country's inhabitants. Pragmatism
motivated Confederation 130 years ago;
pragmatism continues to provide the na-
tional "glue" that holds the country to-
gether.
Canada is a peculiar nation. Its iden-
tity is rooted in one fundamental paradox:
while Canadians inhabit the same geopo-
litical space, they do not all cling to one
common sense of nationalism, nor to one
sense of national purpose. Unlike most
countries, Canada is a nation that makes
a virtue of difference. It is one country
composed of five climatic and topographic
regions, ten provincial and two territorial
governments, two official languages, doz-
ens of thriving ethnic cultures, and even
two national sports. While other coun-
tries, like the United States, have convinc-
ingly painted over the real socioeconomic
and racial differences among their peoples
that have the potential to divide them, Ca-
nadians have chosen to recognize and
even celebrate their internal differences.
The unofficial slogan of Canadian nation-
alism current in the 1960s betrayed this
strange sense ofbeing: "unity in diversity."
Canada has never had one unified, com-
mon sense of nationalism, former Univer-
sity of Toronto historian Maurice Careless
argued almost thirty years ago. It has,
instead, a series of "limited identities."
The results of this tendency, charming and
commendable though they may be in the
kinder, gentler and ostensibly more toler-
ant world of the 1990s, have been damag-
ing to Canada. Canadians have an iden-
tity crisis. Their self-image has, in Robert




is akin to nailing jelly
to the wall and since
the country's found-
ing in 1867, virtually




been the source of a
number of challenges









not" regions, the re-
sults of which surface
from time to time in
political debate. Pub-
lic concern over immi-
gration, and the spec-
tre of growing ethnic
enclaves in urban Canada emerges and re-
emerges in public discourse with disturb-
ing regularity. Advocates of
"multiculturalism" (an official govern-
ment policy since 1971) and stalwarts of
the traditional vision of Canada as a
WAS.P. nation occasionally do battle, in-
variably to a stalemate.
The most apparent division in
Canada, however, dwarfs all of the others.
Canada is a nation rent by language. It is
made up of a majority of English-speak-
ers, most ofwhom reside in the nine prov-
inces and two territories outside of Que-
bec, and a minority of French-speakers,
most of whom reside inside Quebec. The
territorial division reinforces the linguis-
tic one. Quebec is the ancestral home-
land of Canadian francophones and in re-
cent years has become the object of a vo-
cal and aggressive movement for separa-
tion from the rest of Canada. Many
quebecois have come to see themselves
as a powerless colony of English Canada,
stigmatized by their differences in lan-
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guage and culture. For them, separation
from Canada is a panacea. Free to deter-
mine their own cultural, economic, and
international policies, quebecois can
themselves become at last their own dis-
tinct and mature nation. In two province-
wide referenda, in 1980 and in 1995, the
question of separation from Canada was
put to the Quebec electorate, resulting in
only a narrow defeat of the separatists' re-
quest to pursue more independence. The
current Quebec provincial government
promises another referendum, moreover,
by the year 2000. This issue, clearly, is
the most salient one now facing Canadi-
ans and, arguably, the most




is, plainly, a political ques-
tion and, not surprisingly
perhaps, discussions on
this issue have been domi-
nated by those mavens of
all things political: journal-
ists and political scientists.
Their discussions have
been very useful and in-
sightful. Journalists, on
one hand, have focused
their analyses most profit-
ably on the idiosyncracies
and personal philosophies
of the main players in this
conflict: the various Prime Ministers and
provincial premiers whose jobs it has been
to navigate through these rough waters.
Political scientists, more objective and dis-
tant, have aimed their questions at cur-
rent political structures. Will Canada's
Constitution allow Quebec to separate?
Can federalism be rebuilt to satisfy
Quebec's demands? What would Canada
look like after Quebec's departure?
These are essential perspectives and
questions to consider. What they lack,
however, is context; the kind of context
(I'll state here with unabashed immod-
esty) that really lies only in the realm of
history. Unfortunately, Canadian histori-
ans until very recently have been AWOL
on the question of Canadian nationalism
and Quebec separation. ''At a time when
the country needed them most," historian
Michael Bliss noted in 1992, "Canadian
historians were occupied elsewhere,
studying topics and agendas not related
in the slightest way to the crisis with
which most of the nation was wrestling."
But it is in Canada's history, that perhaps
the most illuminating evidence exists for
the study of the Quebec question.
Canada is many things, but above all
it is a pragmatic country that was formed
for pragmatic reasons. This statement, as
simply put as it is; has profound meaning
for the Quebec question. The French lan-
guage and culture in Canada has survived
Canadian nationalism - a "kind ofindeterminacy"
and thrived because of the efforts of
French-speakers to preserve and maintain
them, but also because it was eminently
impractical to do away with them. How
did they get into this mess? Might under-
standing the history of French-English
relations hold some clues to the nature of
the problem? Perhaps a little context is in
order.
The French were the first white Eu-
ropeans to settle successfully and perma-
nently in the part of North America that
became known as Canada. The voyages
of explorers Jacques Cartier (1534-35;
1541) and Samuel de Champlain (1605,
1608) laid claim to this territory for France
and set the foundations for the establish-
ment ofa formal French colony in the New
World. From 1663 until 1760, the fore-
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bears of Quebec's current francophone
population established a prosperous
economy and a series of flourishing com-
munities on the shores of the St.Lawrence
River - New France, an official province of
France. The timing of their arrival and
the depth of their accomplishments have
important meaning in the current debate.
As the first European implant in that part
of the world, to many the French language
and culture deserve protection and its pre-
cedence must be observed.
In 1760, the aims and hopes for a
French-governed nation in North America
came crashing down heavily with the fall
of New France to the British
during the Seven Years War.
This part of the war has been
memorialized (mostly by
anglophone writers) in histo-
ries of the valiant fighting in
the Battle of the Plains of
Abraham and in Benjamin
West's famous painting of the
fallen British hero, James
Wolfe, cut down cruelly while
leading his men to victory
over the French and
canadiens. More significant
was another fact: after 1760,
Quebec - a series of settle-
ments dotting the shores of
the St.Lawrence and number-
ing about 55,000 souls, 95 per
cent of them French-speak-
ing - was now a British possession and
the French canadiens were a conquered
people.
La Conquete - the conquest of New
France - was perhaps the most significant
and formative event in Quebec history and
it bears considerable meaning for the cur-
rent crisis. It ushered in the first British
effort to assimilate the French. Quebec's
first British Governor, James Murray, was
given a directive from the King to make
the colony's official language English,
outlaw the Roman Catholic Church and
French civil law, and destroy the inhabit-
ants' traditional feudal land tenure system.
By the late 1760s, however, it became ap-
parent that the canadiens would not be
dispossessed of their language and culture
so easily. In these years a passive resis-
-----------------' '---------------------
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discourse. The entente vindicated, prag-
matism once again won the day.
Even more profound and symbolic,
however, were the circumstances sur-
rounding the birth of Canada as an inde-
pendent, self-governing Dominion in
1867. Here, too, it was practical consid-
erations, not an attachment to abstract
theory nor "universal" principles that
motivated the union of British North
American colonies into a distinct political
entity. Canada had no Paine,
no Jefferson, no Hamilton. Its
statesmen were not the clear-
thinking, enlightenment ide-
alists of the eighteenth-cen-
tury, but practical,
workmenlike managers of the
stolid mid-Victorian era.
The Dominion of
Canada was formed by the
union of three former British
colonies - New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia, and the United
Canadas. They were moved to
do so not by the "Laws of Na-
ture" nor by reference to "self-
evident truths," but by more
immediate and pressing con-
cerns: a need to secure mar-
kets and resources in a world
committed precariously to
"free trade"; and a concern for
military defence, at a time
when some American
"hawks" wished the Union to tum its army
northward after it had finished off the Con-
federacy and when British officials threat-
ened repeatedly to withdraw its military
commitment to its colonies. Confedera-
tion was motivated, moreover, by politi-
cal deadlock in the United Canadas: in-
creasingly, legislators in English-speaking
Upper Canada and in French-speaking
Lower Canada each desired the freedom
to pass laws specific to their locations
without interference from the other side.
Confederation was, as such, both a
marriage and a divorce. It had the tenor,
more specifically, of an arranged mar-
riage, and the Canadian Constitution
(passed on July 1, 1867 as the British
North America Act), unlike its American
counterpart, reads very much like a pren-
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Canada's francophone population, 1990's
Lower Canada with its English-speaking
neighbor, Upper Canada (now Ontario), in
a vain return to the assimilationist policy
of the early 1760s.
United into one province (the United
Canadas, 1841-1867), with one legislature
and with increasing numbers of British
immigrants arriving, surely it was only a
matter of time before English-speakers
would swamp the French, and the colony
became unicultural - right? Wrong.
Durham and other British thinkers failed
to understand the practical considerations
of colonial politics on the ground. Mor-
ally, in the heady days of "democratic
rage," it would be unconscionable to gov-
ern a population (still a majority through-
out the 1840s) against its wishes. Practi-
cally, with French-speakers holding over
40 per cent of the legislature's seats, it
would be virtually impossible to pass leg-
islation without at least some French sup-
port. The lesson was plain. The French
fact had to be recognized as a permanent
presence and incorporated into the struc-
tures of political power. By 1850, govern-
ment cabinets included French- and En-
glish-speakers, the capital city rotated be-
tween French and English locations, and
both languages were employed in public
tance to British efforts to assimilate them
emerged, a spirit which historian Michel
Brunet dubbed fa survivance. Moreover,
the expected arrival of British colonists
from Britain and New England - the tide
expected to "flood the French" - never
flowed. Assimilating the French, quite
simply, was not practical; so much so that
the British government formally rein-
stated the use of French language, feudal
land tenure, and French civil law through
the passage of the Quebec Act
in 1774. Contented with this
good judgment, the canadiens
spurned in the following year
the overtures of American
revolutionaries to join them in
their quest to throw off the
yoke of British oppression.
From a very early date, the
French-speaking canadiens
and their British neighbors
and governors established and
lived under a fair and lasting
cultural entente.
It is this entente which
has weathered numerous po-
litical storms over the last two
hundred years but has sur-
vived, happily, because of the
inherent pragmatic logic of
cultural coexistence as op-
posed to assimilation or any
sort of "melting pot" notion.
In the 1830s, hundreds of
French-speaking inhabitants in Quebec
(then called Lower Canada) took up arms
in rebellion against the autocratic, English
colonial government in an attempt to
wrestle more real power for their elected
(and largely French-speaking) legislature
from the appointed (and wholly English-
speaking) executive branch. The rebellion
was easily quelled but created enough con-
cern in the mother country to warrant a
special government commission, led by
John George Lambton, the Earl of
Durham. "I expected to find a contest
between a government and a people,"
noted "Radical Jack" in his influential but
perfunctory 1839 report. "I found two
nations warring in the bosom of a single
state." His solution - a foreign solution -
was to unite the mostly French colony of
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uptial agreement. It contains very little
prefatory prose, and focuses on brass tacks
- the terms of union and the specific pow-
ers granted to national and provincial
governments. With very little variation,
these arrangements were accepted by all
of the colonies that subsequently chose
to enter the marriage: Manitoba (1870),
British Columbia (1871), Prince Edward
Island (1873), Saskatchewan and Alberta
(1905), and Newfoundland (1949).
In other ways, Confederation was a
divorce. It was most apparently a practi-
cal separation agreement between Britain
and her colonies, and one that allowed for
the Dominion to exercise a good deal of
freedom. In addition, it was a formal
break-up between Lower Canada and Up-
per Canada, each of which became their
own separate provinces (Quebec and
Ontario, respectively) in the new Domin-
ion. As a province, Quebec hereby gained
the means to preserve and protect its lan-
guage and culture. The entente was ex-
tended and codified in the country's Con-
stitution. And it is under these conditions
that Quebecers and Canadians have lived
ever since.
Given this background, then, what
does Quebec want? Why upset this seem-
ingly blissful apple cart? These questions
are important ones and have baffled even
the most insightful thinkers on the sub-
ject. No one answer can be given, and for
good reason. Quebecers, as a whole, do
not want one thing; they want different
things.
Some Quebecers - an important, and
particularly vocal minority - want to be
freed of their commitments to and rela-
tionship with the rest of Canada. These
folks - the separatists - have been remark-
ably successful in the past thirty years in
getting out their message: French Que-
bec is itself a distinct nation, and for all
the guarantees of linguistic and cultural
protection it enjoys within Confederation,
their full potential as a community will
not be realized until they have established
their own separate state. In the impetu-
ous days of the 1960s, many of these Que-
becers likened their case to post-colonial
regimes in Africa and Asia, and sought
similar independence from its own "for-
eign" oppressor; to become maftres chez
nous - masters in our own house. The
cause was appealling and gave birth in
1966 to a perennial separatist political
party - Ie parti quebecois (PQ) - which
under the guidance of its originator, Rene
Levesque and its current leader Lucien
Bouchard, became and remains the main
vehicle and the loudest champion of
French language rights. To sustain the
movement for separation, however, the PQ
has construed the situation in Quebec as
a crisis; one which must be solved now
(even though "now" has lasted over thirty
years).
Other Quebecers are not so con-
vinced. French Quebecers and English
Canadians don't always understand one
another. That fact is clear. But most have
come to respect each other's differences.
Confederation, born of and sustained by
pragmatism, has become comfortable for
many. This sentiment has been made
plain by the many public opinion polls that
have surveyed the views of French-Cana-
dians towards English Canada, and vice-
versa, with nauseous repetition since the
1960s. Some of the most recent ones re-
port telling results. A poll in February
1996, for example, reported that almost
80 per cent of Quebecers identify them-
selves as Quebecers and as Canadians.
Confederation for Quebec has, moreover,
become profitable for most. More to the
point, it has been profitable for
francophone businessmen since the
1960s, and not just for the handful of
prominent entrepreneurs like Paul
Desmarais of Power Corp. but for myriad
small business owners as well. French Ca-
nadians are in control, in Quebec, of a
thriving, modem, industrial economy.
Recently, the question of Quebec's
potential secession has been referred to
the Supreme Court of Canada to test the
assumption that the province can legally
part company with Canada if it wishes
(Canada's Constitution has no formal pro-
vision for secession). The reference, how-
ever, may be moot. The current federal
government position on the issue is
straight-forward: Quebec can separate,
provided a majority of Quebecers express
the desire to do so in a clearly-worded ref-
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erendum. The wording of the past two
referendum questions was patently un-
clear; one in five Quebecers who voted in
favor of negotiations towards separation
had the misconception that a sovereign
Quebec would remain a province of
Canada! Eighty per cent believed that
Quebec could continue to use the Cana-
dian dollar as its currency. If the question
is to be considered fairly, all of the cards
must be placed on the table. But when
they are, when the next referendum
comes, and it will soon, separatists will
once again be facing a formidable opposi-
tion: a body of pro-union voters and sup-
porters ardently against separation and a
tradition, centuries old, of cultural under-
standing and tolerance.
History can explain many things, but
it is not a predictive art. Even so, there is
reason to have confidence in the contin-
ued unity of Canada. Educated nations,
like elephants, have long collective memo-
ries. The erasure of the long history of
cultural entente in Canada would involve
a considerable amount ofwhitewash, and
a rather large brush. The De-confedera-
tion of Canada is unlikely to take place
because it defies the historical logic that
has held the French and English together
in Canada for so long. These thoughts,
certainly, are the ones that I will be cel-
ebrating on July 1, 1997. ~
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